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Balancing the Till: Finding the Appropriate Cram Down Rate
in Bankruptcy Reorganizations After Till v. SCS Credit
Corporation
The judicial determination of the interest rate a debtor must pay
on secured claims in a bankruptcy reorganization is often the decision
with the most financial ramifications for both debtors and creditors.1
This interest rate is known as the cram down rate because both
Chapters 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code give a bankruptcy court
"cram down" powers, which allow it to confirm a debtor's
reorganization plan over the objection of dissenting creditors.2 For
debtors, the "cram down rate" may be a deciding factor in whether a
reorganization plan is feasible.3 For creditors, the cram down rate is a
major factor in deciding whether to accept or reject a proposed plan.4
Due to its importance, the proper method of determining the cram
down rate has been debated for decades and has caused conflict
among the circuits.5 The Supreme Court finally undertook to settle
the matter when it granted certiorari in Till v. SCS Credit
Corporation.6 Unfortunately, like the circuit courts before it, the
Court could not fully agree on the proper method of determining the
cram down rate. The decision produced three opinions, each of
which endorsed a different approach and none of which garnered the
support of a majority.
After considering and rejecting a number of alternative
-approaches,7 the plurality (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) upheld the decision of the bankruptcy judge by adopting a
1. See Monica Hartman, Comment, Selecting the Correct Cramdown Interest Rate in
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 47 UCLA L. REV. 521, 522 (1999) ("The interest
rate that debtors must pay on claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization is
arguably the most debated economic issue in bankruptcy litigation.").
2. See C. Frank Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: The Search for an
Appropriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D. L. REV. 42, 42 (1987). To be confirmed
over objection, the cram down interest rate, when added to the plan payments, must equal
or exceed the present value of the creditor's allowed secured claim. See id. (explaining the
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2004)).
3. Id. at 43.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 42 (explaining that authority exists to support almost any method of
calculating the cram down rate); see also infra note 35.
6. 124 S. Ct. 1951 (2004).
7. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text (discussing alternative approaches to
determining the cram down rate).
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method utilizing the national prime rate as a base and adding a risk
premium determined by the facts of the case (the "prime-plus"
formula approach).' Justice Thomas advocated compensating the
creditor only for the time delay in payment and not for any risk of
default (the "risk-free" rate), but nonetheless concurred in the
judgment because he found that the interest rate approved by the
bankruptcy judge was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute9 since it was higher than the risk-free rate.' The dissenters
(Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and
Kennedy) advocated adopting the contract rate as a presumption that
the bankruptcy judge could adjust on motion ("presumptive contract"
rate).
11
While the Court provided a thorough analysis of the options, it
failed to produce a majority opinion adopting a single approach and
left practitioners with little guidance as to the decision's implications.
This Recent Development examines the Supreme Court's decision in
Till and concludes that, although the decision produced no clear
holding, lower courts will generally follow the plurality's prime-plus
formula approach.
First, this Recent Development discusses the importance of the
cram down rate and examines the judicial approaches employed prior
to Till. Second, this Recent Development analyzes the areas of
agreement and disagreement among the three opinions in Till and
applies the test for determining the holding of a fragmented Court
from Marks v. United States2 to conclude that the Till decision
produced no clear holding to bind lower courts. Third, this Recent
Development argues that lower courts will generally follow the
plurality's prime-plus formula approach and discusses the application
of that approach. This Recent Development concludes by suggesting
that courts following the prime-plus formula approach adopt
presumptive risk premium points to simplify the determination of the
appropriate risk adjustment.
Because setting the interest rate in a reorganization plan is often
one of the most significant financial decisions in the case and may
determine whether the plan is feasible, choosing the proper method
has led to substantial disagreement. 3 Bankruptcy courts can confirm
8. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1960-62.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2004).
10. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1965-66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
13. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 522.
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a reorganization plan that modifies the rights of a secured creditor
over that creditor's objection. 4 Such a modification has become
known as "cram down" and involves two separate valuation issues. 5
Courts must determine both the value of the collateral securing the
claim16 and the value of the deferred payments proposed by the
plan. 7
The Bankruptcy Code ("Code") requires that plan payments on
a secured claim in both Chapters 1118 and 13 be of a " 'value, as of the
effective date of the plan,' that equals or exceeds the value of the
creditor's allowed secured claim."' 9  This means that the total
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2004) (authorizing a court, under certain
circumstances, to approve a plan that is objected to by a "trustee ... or holder of an
allowed secured claim"); see also David G. Epstein, Don't Go and Do Something Rash
About Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 437 (1998) ("[T]he plan can be
'crammed down' over the objection of the secured creditor."). To be modified over
objection, the creditor's security interest must be "in anything other than 'real property
that is the debtor's principal residence.' " Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1959 (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2) (2004)).
15. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 437-38.
16. The proper method for determining the value of the collateral in Chapter 13 cases
was settled by the Supreme Court in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953,
965 (1997) ("[Tlhe value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) 'cram down' option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like
asset for the same 'proposed... use.' ").
17. Epstein, supra note 14, at 438.
18. Whether Till is equally applicable to reorganization plans under Chapters 11 and
13 of the Bankruptcy Code is unclear. The Court considered the matter in a Chapter 13
case and made arguably conflicting statements as to its applicability in Chapter 11 cases.
Compare Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1958-59 ("We think it likely that Congress intended
bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the same approach when choosing an
appropriate interest rate under any of these provisions."), with id. at 1960 n.14 ("[W]hen
picking a cram down rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an
efficient market would produce."). Because "courts and commentators have generally
treated the question of how the cram down interest rate should be determined as a
question that is answered the same in Chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases," Epstein, supra note
14, at 441, it is likely that they will continue to do so. However, this Recent Development
does not discuss that issue. For a discussion of Till's applicability to other Chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code, see generally Daniel J. Carragher, News at 11: What the Supreme
Court's Prime Plus Ruling Means for Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (July/Aug.
2004), which suggests why the Court's ruling in Till should not affect existing Chapter 11
precedent. Not all commentators agree on the implications of Till. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Yerbich, How Do You Count the Votes-or Did Till Tilt the Game?, AM. BANKR. INST. J.
10, 59 (July/Aug. 2004) (concluding that "bankruptcy judges will likely apply the Till
formula approach to § 1129").
19. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1958 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii)(2004)); see also id. at
1959 n.10 (noting parallel provisions in several parts of Chapter 11). The cram down
provision of Chapter 13 requires, in part, that "the value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than
the allowed amount of such claim." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2004). The Chapter 11
cram down provision requires, in part:
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payments made to secured creditors under the plan must equal or
exceed the present value of their allowed secured claim.20 Because
the right to a future payment is worth less than immediate payment of
that same amount, courts must determine what interest rate will
adequately compensate for the delay in payment and provide the
creditor with the present value required by the Code.21 The proper
method for determining this cram down interest rate has divided
courts22 and provided ample fodder for Law Review articles.23  The
absence of guidance from the Code 4 or legislative historyzs has
further fostered the debate.
The dispute in Till arose when a secured creditor objected to the
cram down rate proposed in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan and argued
that under the "coerced loan" approach it was entitled to interest at
the rate of 21 %.26 The Tills had purchased a used truck in October
1998 and entered into a retail installment contract for payment of
$6,425.75 of the purchase price at 21% interest per year for 136
weeks.27  The contract was immediately assigned to SCS Credit
Corporation ("SCS") and SCS retained a purchase money security
interest giving it the right to repossess the vehicle if the Tills defaulted
under the contract.28  The Tills filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in October 1999, which
[Tihat each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's
interest in the estate's interest in such property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2004).
20. See Matthew Y. Harris, Comment, Chapter 13 Cram Down Interest Rates:
Another Day, Another Dollar-A Cry for Help in Ending the Quest for the Appropriate
Rate, 67 MIss. L.J. 567, 569 (1997) (noting that the objective of the legislation is to place
secured creditors in the same position they would have been if they had been allowed to
repossess their collateral and sell it at the time of filing).
21. See John K. Pearson et al., Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the
Cramdown Interest Rate, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 35, 36-37 (1996).
22. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
23. See supra notes 1-2, 15, 20-21.
24. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1958 ("The Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance as to
which of the rates of interest advocated by the four opinions in this case ... Congress had
in mind when it adopted the cram down provision."); Harris, supra note 20, at 569 ("Much
to the consternation of courts, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) gives no guidance as to what
the interest rate should be.").
25. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 526-27 (surveying the legislative history of the cram
down provisions and finding that it does not provide much guidance on how to set the
interest rate for the secured creditor's claim).
26. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1957.




automatically stayed any debt collection activities by creditors.29 At
the time of filing, the outstanding balance owed to SCS under the
contract was $4,894.89; however, by agreement of the parties, the
value of the truck was only $4,000.30 Accordingly, SCS's secured
claim was limited to $4,000 (the value of the truck) and the remaining
$894.89 was unsecured.3' The Tills' proposed plan provided for cram
down interest of 9.5% per year on the secured portion of SCS's
claim.3 2 This cram down rate was arrived at using the prime-plus
formula approach.33
The history of disagreement over the appropriate cram down
approach is demonstrated by the lower court decisions in Till.34 The
four approaches advocated by the lower courts in Till-the formula,
coerced loan, presumptive contract rate and cost of funds
approaches-are the primary approaches adopted by various courts
throughout the country.35 The bankruptcy court approved of the
prime-plus formula approach as proposed by the debtors' plan and
supported by the bankruptcy trustee.36 This approach provided a
cram down rate of 9.5% based on the national prime rate of 8% plus
1.5% to account for the risk of default.37 Courts that have applied the
formula approach begin with a base rate determined independent of
the bankruptcy and adjust that rate upward using a risk premium
based on the particular facts of the case before the court.3 8 Base rates
that have been utilized include the prime rate39 (the "prime-plus"




32. Id. at 1957.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1956 ("The proceedings in this case that led to our grant of certiorari
identified four different methods" of determining the cram down rate).
35. See Harris, supra note 20, at 580 (noting that the circuit courts are split on the
proper approach for determining the cram down rate, with the Third, Sixth, and Fifth
Circuits following the "coerced loan" theory, the Seventh Circuit (in the Chapter 12
context) and several lower courts following the "cost of funds" approach, and the Second
Circuit following the "treasury rate" formula approach). For courts adopting the
presumptive contract rate approach, see infra note 46. See generally Epstein, supra note 14
(discussing approaches adopted by various courts).
36. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1957.
37. Id.
38. See Pearson, supra note 21, at 50 ("IT]he formula approach requires the court to
adopt a risk-free market rate as a base, and then add a risk premium corresponding to the
court's determination of the riskiness of the reorganization plan.").
39. For a case adopting the prime-plus formula approach, see In re Fowler, 903 F.2d
694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990).
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instrument4" (the "treasury rate" formula approach). The
determination of the appropriate risk premium is dependent on the
particular facts of the case.41 Courts have generally considered such
factors as the debtor's circumstances, prior credit history, and the
viability of the reorganization plan.42
The district court in Till reversed the bankruptcy court's prime-
plus formula approach and endorsed the "coerced" or "forced loan"
approach, explaining that cram down interest rates should be set at
the level the creditor could have received had it sold the collateral
and reinvested the sale proceeds.43  The origin of the coerced loan
approach has been credited to a Collier's on Bankruptcy statement
that "deferred payment of an obligation under a plan is a coerced
loan and the rate of return with respect to such loan must correspond
to the rate which would be charged or obtained by the creditor
making a loan to a third party with similar terms, duration, collateral,
and risk."'  Employing this approach, the district court in Till found
that 21% was the appropriate cram down rate based on the creditor's
testimony about the rate available for subprime market loans.4"
The Seventh Circuit majority agreed generally with the district
court's rationale but endorsed a modified version of the coerced loan
approach using the contract rate (here, 21%) as a presumptive cram
down rate that either party could challenge.46 Courts that have
adopted a presumptive contract rate point to its simplicity and ability
to reduce litigation costs as reasons for doing SO.47 The creditor may
rebut the presumptive rate by showing that interest rates or other
costs have increased since the making of the contract, or the debtor
may rebut the presumptive rate by showing that such costs have
40. Pearson, supra note 21, at 50. For a case adopting the treasury rate formula
approach, see generally Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d
55 (2d Cir. 1997).
41. Pearson, supra note 21, at 50.
42. See Harris, supra note 20, at 578 (reviewing a Second Circuit case in which the
court considered these factors).
43. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2004).
44. Pearson, supra note 21, at 44 (quoting 5 COLLIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.03,
at 1129-104 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995)). For cases adopting the coerced loan
approach, see In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997) and Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 71 (3d Cir. 1993).
45. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1957. Subprime market loans are higher-interest loans to
consumers with impaired or non-existent credit histories. Sue Kirtchoff & Sandra Block,
Subprime Loan Market Grows Despite Troubles, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 2004, B1.
46. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1958; In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2002). For other
cases adopting the contract rate rebuttable presumption, see Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214-
15 and Jones, 999 F.2d at 70-71.




The Seventh Circuit dissent in Till advocated adopting either the
formula approach or a cost of funds approach, which focuses on the
creditor's cost of replacing "the collateral with money from another
source." 49 The cost of funds approach is based on the rationale that
"since the creditor in a cram down is deprived of the opportunity to
sell the collateral and reinvest the proceeds, it is only just that the
creditor receive the same rate of interest necessary to borrow the
same amount."5 ° Although this approach has been adopted by some
bankruptcy courts,5 circuit courts have generally rejected it on the
ground that it undercompensates creditors by excluding transaction
costs from the cram down rate.52
The risk-free approach advocated by Justice Thomas in Till has
never been a serious contender in the search for the appropriate cram
down rate.53 Justice Thomas himself admitted that a risk-free
approach (or even the prime-plus approach) may systematically
undercompensate secured creditors for the actual risk of default. 4
Although Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality and dissent that
the promise of future payments involves a risk of nonpayment, in his
view such a risk is not contemplated by the statute, because the
statute refers to the value of property rather than the value of a
promise to pay. Under this view, the plan need only include an
interest rate sufficient to compensate the creditor for the time delay
in payment; no consideration is given for the risk of default. 6 Justice
Thomas accused the plurality and dissent of ignoring the plain
language of the statute to ensure that secured creditors are not
undercompensated.5 7  Based on his reading of the statute, the
possibility of undercompensation is a matter to be addressed by
48. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1957-58.
49. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 595-96 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
50. Harris, supra note 20, at 575.
51. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 192 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1991) (adopting cost of
funds approach).
52. See Harris, supra note 20, at 574-77.
53. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1964 (noting that "many judges who have considered the
issue ... have rejected the risk-free approach"); id. at 1976-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Circuit authority uniformly rejects the risk-free approach. While Circuits addressing the
issue are divided over how to calculate risk... all of them require some compensation for
risk, either explicitly or implicitly.").
54. See id. at 1966 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 1965 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. See id. at 1966 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. See id. at 1965 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2005] 1021
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Congress rather than resolved by the Court. 8
Although the plurality in Till agreed that the text of Section
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) may be read to support Justice Thomas's conclusion
that Congress did not intend the cram down rate to include
compensation for the risk of default, they contended that the statute
"is better read to incorporate all of the commonly understood
components of 'present value,' including any risk of nonpayment."5 9
Thus, the Till plurality, like the lower courts before it, declined to
interpret the statute as disallowing compensation to secured creditors
for the risk of default inherent in a bankruptcy case.
Despite the disagreements regarding the proper method for
determining the cram down rate, courts have consistently agreed that
the cram down rate must be based on a market interest rate.60 It
appears that the Supreme Court Justices also agreed on this point.
The prime plus formula approach is clearly based on a market rate.
As the Till plurality explained, "the [prime-plus formula] approach
begins by looking to the national prime rate, reported daily in the
press, which reflects the financial market's estimate of the amount a
commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower
to compensate for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of
inflation, and the relatively slight risk of default. ' 61 The presumptive
contract rate endorsed by the dissent is based on the market rate
available to the debtor at the time of the loan.62 Whether Justice
Thomas's "risk-free" approach is based on a market interest rate is
unclear, because he never explicitly stated how the risk-free rate
should be determined. Based on his comment in a footnote that
"[t]he prime rate is '[t]he interest rate most closely approximating the
riskless or pure rate for money,' ",63 it may be inferred that he
approves of the use of the prime rate. Of course, although the prime
rate factors in the effect of some types of risk, it does not take into
account the risk of nonpayment by a particular debtor.64 The treasury
rate is a risk-free rate for money;65 thus, if Justice Thomas does not
approve of the prime rate, his risk-free rate would likely be based on
58. See id. at 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring).
59. See id. at 1963-64.
60. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 528 ("[E]very court to address this issue agrees that
these code sections require debtors to use the market interest rate in their plans .....
61. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1961.
62. See id. at 1968-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1967 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING &
FINANCE 830 (9th ed. 1991)).
64. See Harris, supra note 20, at 581-82.
65. Id. at 579.
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the treasury rate, which is also a market rate. Assuming Justice
Thomas approves of the use of the prime or treasury rate, the one
area of agreement among the nine Justices is the use of a market rate.
Unfortunately, adoption by the Court of the use of an undefined
"market rate" does little to settle the disagreement over the
appropriate method for determining the cram down rate, since lower
courts already agreed on this point.
The plurality and dissent agreed that the appropriate cram down
rate approach includes consideration of the risk of default posed by
the debtor.66 The areas of disagreement were the beginning point for
setting the rate and the determination of which party should bear the
burden of adjusting the base rate.67 The plurality's approach begins
with the "concededly low" prime rate and places the "burden
squarely on the creditor" to prove the appropriate upward
adjustment.' The dissent advocated beginning with the contract rate
as a presumption that could be adjusted on motion of either party.69
Whichever party sought to adjust the presumptive contract rate
would bear the burden of proving the appropriate adjustment. Since
Justice Thomas disagreed with including a risk premium and instead
advanced a risk-free rate,7" he had no burden of proof to consider
because all debtors would pay whatever the risk-free rate was on the
effective date of their plans.
Although a majority of the Court agreed with the bankruptcy
court's approval of the Tills' proposed cram down rate, only a
plurality agreed with the method used in reaching it and only a
plurality placed the burden on the creditor. However, the Court has
given guidance as to finding a holding in such a fractured decision. In
Marks v. United States,71 the Court stated that "when a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... ' "72 Since the dissenters did
not expressly concur in any aspect of the judgment, it appears that
66. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We agree [with the plurality]
that any deferred payments to a secured creditor must fully compensate it for the risk that
[plan] failure will occur.").
67. See Yerbich, supra note 18, at 10.
68. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1961.
69. See id. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 1965-66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
72. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 (1976)).
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any agreement they had with the plurality is not relevant to
determining the Court's holding.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment because the 9.5%
interest rate approved by the bankruptcy court was higher than the
risk-free rate he advocated and would, therefore, adequately
compensate the creditor for the delay in payment.73  He did not
concur in any part of the plurality's opinion and expressly rejected the
rationale endorsed by the plurality.74 The only possible ground for
agreement by Justice Thomas with the plurality's rationale is the
utilization of a market rate and, specifically, the prime rate.
However, only four Justices, those in the plurality, agreed that the
prime rate should be adjusted for the risk of default. Under Marks, it
is unlikely but possible that the prime rate with no risk adjustment is
the applicable cram down rate, since this holding is arguably the
narrowest grounds of concurrence.
Resolving the issue of whether there is a binding holding in Till
centers on whether either the plurality opinion or the concurrence is a
"logical subset" or "common denominator" of the other opinion.75
As previously noted, it can be inferred that Justice Thomas approved
of the use of the prime rate as the appropriate risk-free rate.76 If this
is accepted as fact, then the use of the prime rate is the common
denominator between the plurality opinion and the concurrence.
Under this approach, Justice Thomas's unadjusted prime rate is a
73. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1968 (Thomas, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 1965 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. The determination of whether a holding is a "logical subset" or a "common
denominator" has been explained by the Second Circuit as follows:
This rule [in Marks] only works in instances where one opinion can meaningfully
be regarded as "narrower" than another-only when one opinion is a logical
subset of other, broader opinions, that is to say, only when that narrow opinion is
the common denominator representing the position approved by at least five
Justices. When it is not possible to discover a single standard that legitimately
constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no law
of the land because no one standard commands the support of a majority of the
Supreme Court.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted) cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004). The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the Marks test may be easier to state than to apply. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
The Second Circuit attempted to apply the Marks test to the Supreme Court's
decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), and found that "[b]ecause the
substantive due process reasoning presented in Justice Kennedy's concurrence is not a
logical subset of the plurality's takings analysis, no "common denominator" can be said to
exist among the Court's opinions." Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d at 198.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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logical subset of the plurality's prime-plus approach. Acceptance of
this argument would make the unadjusted prime rate the "law of the
land" for determining cram down interest.77
A different view of the opinions results in no common
denominator regarding the usage of the unadjusted prime rate as the
cram down rate. While the plurality's approach begins with the prime
rate, the opinion states that the formula approach "requires a
bankruptcy court to adjust the prime rate" for the greater risk of
nonpayment posed by bankrupt debtors.78  Thus, the plurality's
formula approach is dependent on the ability of the bankruptcy court
to add a risk premium, 79 whereas the concurrence maintains that no
risk premium is intended under the Code.8 Simply interpreting
Justice Thomas's risk-free rate as the prime rate may not be enough
to reconcile the fundamental differences between the two opinions on
the need for a risk premium-Justice Thomas specifically rejected the
addition of a debtor-specific risk adjustment,81 and the plurality
specifically rejected a risk-free rate.' Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment reversing the Seventh Circuit's use of the presumptive
contract rate,83 not because he endorsed the rationale adopted by the
bankruptcy court and the plurality, but because he concluded that the
debtors' proposed cram down rate would sufficiently compensate the
creditor since it exceeded the risk-free rate, leaving the creditor with
"no cause for complaint."8 Based on the fundamental differences
between the plurality's opinion and the concurrence, one opinion is
not a clear, logical subset of the other. Under this analysis, there is no
common denominator and thus no "law of the land."85
77. See Yerbich, supra note 18, at 10 (suggesting that the appropriate cram down rate
under a Marks analysis may be the prime rate without adjustment). Of course, Justice
Thomas never explicitly approved of the use of the prime-rate as his risk-free rate. If
Justice Thomas's risk-free rate is something other than the prime rate, then any grounds
for a common denominator under this approach vanish.
78. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1961.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1966-67 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. See id. at 1965 (Thomas, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 1964.
83. See id. at 1968 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 1978 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that Justice Thomas disagrees
with the other Justices on the need for a risk premium and "would reverse because the
rate proposed here, being above the risk-free rate, gave respondent no cause for
complaint").
85. Where no common denominator is found in a fragmented decision, the authority
of the holding is limited to its specific result. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The only binding aspect of such a splintered decision is
its specific result, and so the authority of Eastern Enterprises is confined to its holding that
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Still another argument endorses the plurality's rationale as the
Court's definitive holding. Under this argument, the dissenting
opinion is viewed as concurring in part, to the extent that it agreed
with the plurality that the risk of default must be taken into account.86
This argument gives eight votes to the inclusion of a risk premium. 7
Conceding that Justice Thomas's risk-free rate is the prime rate, the
use of a prime rate would have five votes.88 Tallying the votes results
in a base prime rate with a risk premium-the plurality's formula
approach. This argument must fail, however, because it is not
reconcilable with the rule in Marks, which looks only to those
members of the Court who concurred in the judgment.89 The dissent
acknowledged its agreement with the plurality on the need for a risk
premium9 ° but did not expressly concur in any part of the judgment.
Therefore, pursuant to Marks, the dissent cannot be considered in
determining the Court's holding.
As shown, conducting the Marks analysis uncovers no basis for a
finding that the prime-plus method is the Court's holding. The prime-
plus rationale did not receive the assent of five Justices, nor does the
concurrence support the inclusion of a risk premium. Therefore,
there are no grounds of concurrence to endorse the prime-plus
method as the Court's holding. A stronger argument may be made to
endorse the unadjusted prime rate as the narrowest grounds of
concurrence. However, this approach should also be rejected because
it is not clear that Justice Thomas approved of the use of the prime
rate, and even assuming that he did, the narrow level of agreement
between the plurality and concurrence on the use of the prime rate
should not be enough to overcome the fundamental disagreement on
the need for a risk adjustment. Additionally, lower courts would
likely reject an interpretation of Till resulting in the unadjusted prime
rate as the Court's holding due to the longstanding rejection of a risk-
free rate and because such an outcome seems anomalous since only
the Coal Act is unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises."), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1103 (2004).
86. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We agree that any deferred
payments to a secured creditor must fully compensate it for the risk that such a failure [of
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan] will occur.").
87. Yerbich, supra note 18, at 10.
88. See id.
89. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ...... (emphasis added)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
90. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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one of nine Justices advocated for a risk-free approach. Accordingly,
the fragmented decision in Till produced no "law of the land because
no one standard command[ed] the support of a majority of the
Supreme Court."91
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in Till failed
to produce a clear, binding holding, as a practical matter, courts will
likely view the plurality's decision as the controlling opinion and
follow the prime-plus formula approach. Four Justices clearly
advocated this approach and one additional Justice found enough
agreement with the outcome it produced to concur in the judgment.
Because the outcome produced by the bankruptcy court's acceptance
of the prime-plus formula approach garnered the votes of a majority,
lower courts may reasonably conclude that if the issue were before
the Court again, those same five votes would uphold the prime-plus
formula approach. The same cannot be said of the risk-free or
contract rate approaches. Thus, although the Marks test does not
endorse the prime-plus approach as the Court's holding, lower courts
may find the plurality approach more attractive than a single Justice's
concurrence or a four Justice dissent. This conclusion is
demonstrated by decisions discussing Till, which accept without
question that the Supreme Court adopted a prime-plus formula rate.'
Additional proof is found in Collier's on Bankruptcy, which states:
"Till holds that a formula approach based upon the prime rate of
interest best carries out the intentions of Congress. ... " Assuming
that lower courts will follow the plurality's opinion, the question
91. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
92. See, e.g., In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755,764 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) ("[T]he Court held
that the proper approach that bankruptcy courts must take in determining the adequate
rate of interest on cram down loans in Chapter 13 proceedings is the formula or "risk plus"
approach."); In re Scrogum, No. 04-72289, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1376, at *3-4 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 2004) ("The United States Supreme Court has recently determined that the formula
approach-taking the national prime rate, then adjusting it to compensate the lender for
the risk incurred in making the loan-is the appropriate method for determining the
adequate rate of interest on crammed down loans pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan."); In re
Berksteiner, No. 03-13203, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1576, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) ("In
Till, the Supreme Court adopted the formula approach...."); In re Pokrzywinski, 311 B.R.
846, 849 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court adopted a formula rate for cram
down interest based on the prime rate plus an appropriate adjustment to account for the
risk of nonpayment."); In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631, 633 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) ("[T]he
Supreme Court held that the formula approach, requiring an adjustment of the prime
national interest rate based on risk of nonpayment, was the appropriate method .. "); In
re Harken, No. 04-02914, 2004 WL 3019467, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004) ("[T]he
Supreme Court adopted the "formula approach" to determine the appropriate [cram-
down] interest rate to apply ... ").
93. COLLIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY I 1129.06(1)(c)(i) (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th
ed. revised 2004).
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becomes: Where does the prime-plus formula approach leave the
cram down rate?
While adoption of the prime-plus formula method may be
viewed as a landslide victory for debtors, there were more debtor-
friendly options available to the Court in Till. Undeniably, Justice
Thomas's risk-free approach is more debtor-friendly since it would
give debtors a "risk-free" rate with no risk adjustment whatsoever. 4
Also more debtor-friendly is the treasury rate formula method
adopted by the Second Circuit that uses the rate on a United States
Treasury instrument as the base.95 The rate on a treasury bond is
risk-free,96 and therefore this method would consistently result in a
lower cram down rate than one based on the prime rate.97
Accordingly, while no one would contend that the plurality
decision in Till is a victory for creditors, it could have been worse.
Unlike the treasury rate, the prime rate includes a built-in risk
premium to account for the inherent risk that even the most
creditworthy borrowers may default.9" Additionally, while it may
provide little solace to creditors, as Justice Thomas points out, the
Supreme Court's decision in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash99
provides some risk cushion by adopting a creditor-friendly
replacement-value standard for the valuation of the secured claim.100
Of course, how well the formula approach actually compensates
creditors will depend on the prime rate at the time of the plan and the
level of additional risk premium courts will allow.
Under the Till plurality's prime-plus formula approach, creditors
bear the burden of proving the appropriate risk premium to be added
to the prime rate. 01 The plurality explained that the size of the risk
94. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1966 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d
Cir. 1997).
96. Harris, supra note 20, at 579.
97. Whereas the rate on a treasury bond is risk-free, the prime rate includes a risk
premium to reflect the inherent risk of default present in a loan to the most creditworthy
borrower. Id. at 581-82. The prime rate has typically exceeded the three-month treasury
bill rate by 2% to 3.5%. See Federal Reserve Board, Selected Interest Rates, Historical
Data, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/data.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005)
(listing historical data on selected interest rates) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). At the time of the Tills' bankruptcy filing, the prime rate was 2% higher than
the treasury rate. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1974 n.10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Courts could avoid
the treasury rate resulting in a consistently lower cram down rate by increasing the risk
premium to account for the difference between the treasury rate and prime rate.
98. See Harris, supra note 20, at 581-82.
99. 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
100. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. See id. at 1961 (stating that the formula approach "places the evidentiary burden
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adjustment is dependent on such factors as "the circumstances of the
estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of
the reorganization plan."1 2 The plurality further explained that some
evidence of the appropriate risk adjustment will be included in the
debtor's bankruptcy filings, but "[t]he court must.., hold a hearing at
which the debtor and any creditors may present evidence about the
appropriate risk adjustment."" 3 Thus, in every case where the
creditor disagrees with the prime rate as the cram down rate and the
parties cannot agree on a risk premium, a hearing will be necessary.
The necessity of a hearing seems contradictory to the plurality's
assertion that "the formula approach... minimizes the need for
potentially costly additional evidentiary proceedings."' Although
expert testimony may not be required as it has been under other
approaches, the necessity of a hearing places a burden on a debtor
whose funds should be preserved for the plan and a creditor whose
recovery is limited.
The Till plurality also declined to set a scale for the risk
adjustment and merely noted that "courts have generally approved
adjustments of 1% to 3%. "1°5 This represents a small victory for
creditors and for judicial discretion. Although most courts will
remain within the "safe range" of 1% to 3%, they should not feel
compelled to do so because the plurality opinion does not require
adherence to a set range.1°6 However, the plurality did caution
against setting an interest rate "so high as to doom the plan."1 7 It
suggested that a plan so likely to fail that it "necessitate[s] an 'eye-
popping' interest rate ... probably should not be confirmed."'08




105. Id. at 1962.
106. See In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755, 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) ("The Court hastens to
note ... that the 1% to 3% range suggested in Till is not necessarily a cap and
emphatically rejects a rule of thumb with respect to risk factors to be added to risk-free
discount rates.").
107. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1962.
108. Id. (quoting In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting)).
In rebutting what it viewed as the dissent's belief that a pre-bankruptcy default translates
into a high probability of default under the plan, the plurality explained that:
Congress intended to create a program under which plans that qualify for
confirmation have a high probability of success. Perhaps bankruptcy judges
currently confirm too many risky plans, but the solution is to confirm fewer plans,
not to set default cram down rates at absurdly high levels, thereby increasing the
risk of default.
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Thus, a court following the plurality's formula approach could safely
set the risk adjustment at any rate that did not doom an otherwise
feasible plan.
Beyond noting the general factors that a court may consider in
making risk adjustments, the Till plurality provided little guidance as
to how creditors should actually go about proving the risk factors and
how a court should allocate risk premium points to those factors.
Unfortunately, most cases prior to Till adopting a variation of the
formula approach are equally vague in discussing how courts should
ultimately determine the appropriate risk premium.' While such
vagueness may be positive in terms of permitting bankruptcy judges
to exercise discretion in setting the cram down rate, it provides
practitioners with little guidance as to how courts will conduct a cram
down analysis. 110
A review of bankruptcy court cases that apply risk premium
points to a base rate may provide some guidance. In a case adopting
the treasury rate formula approach, a Florida bankruptcy court
discussed the factors it considered in deciding that a risk premium of
5% was appropriate to add to the base five-year treasury bill rate of
6.750%. 1' The court based its determination on the debtor's
circumstances, credit history, and the feasibility of his plan."2 The
court noted that the debtor defaulted in his payments almost
immediately after purchasing the vehicle securing the loan."3
Additionally, the vehicle was repossessed two weeks prior to the
debtor's Chapter 13 filing, and although the debtor made the required
plan payments, not all were timely."' Despite finding that the debtor
"exhibited past problems in making timely payments," the court
Id. at 1963. Thus, the plurality suggests that bankruptcy judges give more consideration to
feasibility when selecting the cram down rate and confirming the plan. See id.
109. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64
(2d Cir. 1997) (adopting the treasury rate formula method and noting that "[t]he actual
rate will depend upon the circumstances of the debtor," but providing little guidance to
lower courts as to how to specifically determine the premium); Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Ivey (In
re Ivey), 147 B.R. 109, 118 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1992) (adopting treasury rate formula
method and instructing courts to "explicitly focus on the rights of the parties, balancing
the interests sought to be furthered by bankruptcy law").
110. Such guidance is important because it provides debtors with a standard by which
to propose a cram down rate that the court would likely approve over objection, and it
provides creditors with a standard by which to determine whether objection to the
debtor's proposed rate is likely to be productive. Such guidance allows both debtors and
creditors to reduce the costs of disputing the proposed cram down rate.






noted that the debtor appeared to "have the financial ability to make
all future payments.""' 5 This analysis led the court to apply a "high-
risk premium of 5%" due to the possibility of future financial
problems and to protect the creditor from "any loss due to the
depreciating value of the car in the event [the debtor] fail[ed] to make
his Chapter 13 payments.""1 6
A Massachusetts bankruptcy court adopted a variation of the
formula approach in determining the appropriate cram down rate for
a mortgage loan."7 The court used as a base rate "the average annual
interest rate for thirty year fixed residential mortgages," which was
7.82%.118 To this base, the court added the following risk premium
points: (1) "one percentage point because of the Debtors' history of
defaults in payment of the mortgage;" (2) "one point because of the
substantial prepetition mortgage arrearage;" and (3) "one percentage
point because of the Debtors' proposed balloon payment."" 9 The
court declined to add any further risk premium points because of
testimony that the collateral would likely appreciate and the fact that
the duration of the plan was less than the original maturity date of the
loan.12
0
The few decisions that have been issued since Till generally
adopt the plurality's prime-plus formula approach without providing
a thorough analysis of its application. However, an Illinois
bankruptcy court decision applying the Till prime-plus approach to
uphold the debtor's proposed cram down rate of 7% did provide a
thorough analysis of the circumstances considered in reaching that
decision.21 In summary, the court noted that "many of the most
significant risk factors strongly favor plan confirmation: [The debtor]
has worked steadily for the past several years, receives regular child
support payments from her husband, is on payroll control, and has
made all plan payments to date."122 The court found that the creditor
"failed to satisfy its burden to establish the need for an interest rate
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In re St. Cloud, 209 B.R. 801, 808 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). Although 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2) (2000) limits the applicability of the cram down rate to claims secured by
anything other than "real property that is the debtor's principal residence," it appears that
in this case the mortgage was secured by rental property. See id. at 804 ("The Debtors
also reported receiving $600.00 per month in rental income .....
118. Id. at 808.
119. Id. at 808-09.
120. See id. at 809.
121. In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755, 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
122. Id.
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higher than the one proposed" by the debtor and concluded that "the
proposed interest rate of 7% will fairly compensate [the creditor] for
any risk factor inherent in" the debtor's plan.123  Based on the
applicable national prime rate of 4.75%, the debtor's plan provided
for a risk premium of 2.25 %.124
Although two of the foregoing cases, ,Chiodo and St. Cloud, did
not apply the prime-plus formula approach adopted by the plurality,
the reasoning used in determining the appropriate risk premium is
generally applicable to such an approach. Each of these cases
illustrate how a court may go about analyzing specific risk factors;
however, only the Massachusetts bankruptcy court translated those
factors into individual premium points. The Florida bankruptcy court
merely added a single premium without explaining which factor
necessitated what proportion of the premium. Similarly, the Illinois
bankruptcy court provided a thorough analysis of the debtor's
circumstances but did not explain what proportion of the 2.25% risk
premium was required by which factors. While these opinions
provide practitioners with a general idea of how a cram down rate
may be determined using a formula approach, they provide minimal
guidance as to how future cases may be decided because they are very
fact-specific and do not set forth standard risk premiums that may be
relied on in setting a cram down rate. Providing clear guidance to
debtors and creditors as to the proposed risk premium that would be
acceptable to a court could allow the parties to reach agreement on
the cram down rate prior to litigation and avoid the time and expense
of an evidentiary hearing.
This Recent Development suggests that courts set presumptive
risk premium points125 applicable to certain standard factors in order
to guide debtors and creditors in determining an acceptable cram
down rate. Presumptive risk premium points would ensure that each
debtor would pay an equal premium for the same risk factor, while
tailoring the total risk premium to the facts of the particular case. A
presumptive rate could be set for factors common to most plans, such
as the inherent risk of non-payment in a bankruptcy case,"26 the
standard types of collateral, and the duration of the plan beyond the
original maturity date of the loan.27 Courts could conduct an en banc
123. Id.
124. Id. at 764.
125. See Harris, supra note 20, at 581-82 (suggesting adoption of the prime-plus
method and allowing courts to set a presumptive risk premium by local rule).
126. See id. at 582.
127. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2004) (listing the nature of the
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hearing on the issue and allow participation by interested parties" in
order to receive information from local debtor and creditor
representatives as to what they view as proper standard factors and
proper presumptive risk premiums for those factors. The en banc
decision issued pursuant to the hearing would then set forth
presumptive premiums for certain standard factors that would apply
to all applicable cases in the district.
To demonstrate, after hearing from interested parties, a court
may issue an en banc decision allocating presumptive risk premium
points to the following standard factors: (1) 1% for inherent risk of
non-payment; (2) 1% for depreciable assets such as a vehicle; (3)
0.10% for every year the plan extends beyond the original loan
maturity date.129 Using the decision setting forth these presumptive
rates as a guide, a debtor could calculate the appropriate proposed
cram down rate. If the debtor desired to retain an automobile with a
loan maturity date of three years and proposed a five year plan, the
cram down rate would begin with the prime rate and include
presumptive risk premium points of 2.20%. Thus, if the prime rate on
the effective date of the plan was 6%, the debtor would propose a
security and the duration of the plan as factors to be considered in determining the
appropriate risk adjustment). The Till plurality noted that in determining the appropriate
risk adjustment "the debtor and creditors may not incur significant additional expense"
because "[s]ome of [the relevant] evidence will be included in the debtor's bankruptcy
filings." Id. By applying presumptive risk premium points to standard factors that are
evidenced in the debtor's bankruptcy filings, debtors and creditors may avoid incurring
any expense with regard to those factors.
128. See Administrative Order Regarding Interest Rates in Chapter 13 Cases (Jan. 27,
2005) [hereinafter Administrative Order] (adopting specific guidelines to be followed in
Chapter 13 cases filed in the Western District of North Carolina after "confer[ring] with
the Chapter 13 Trustees and the bankruptcy bar" at an en banc hearing regarding the
application of the Supreme Court's decision in Till), available at http://www.ncwb.uscourts.
gov/adminorders/ao663.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
129. These factors and risk premiums are for illustrative purposes only and are not
intended to represent a complete listing of the factors courts should consider or the
appropriate level for each risk premium. The court would be aided in making those
determinations by holding an en banc hearing and allowing participation by Chapter 13
trustees and the local bankruptcy bar. An Illinois bankruptcy court applying the Till
plurality's prime-plus approach enumerated some additional factors courts may consider,
noting that "[t]he determination [of the proper risk adjustment] may be assisted by
evidence included in the debtor's bankruptcy filings, such as work history, job stability,
cash flow, disposable income, the existence or absence of prior bankruptcy filings, and the
contents of the Chapter 13 plan." Bivens, 317 B.R. at 764 (emphasis added). However,
the Till plurality indicated that the risk premium should not include consideration of "the
creditor's circumstances or its prior interactions with the debtor." Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1961.
See Bivens, 317 B.R. at 769 ("The Supreme Court has unequivocally noted that in
selecting a cram down rate, bankruptcy courts need not consider a creditor's prior
interactions with a debtor.").
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cram down interest rate of 8.20%.
Providing presumptive standard risk premiums would encourage
agreement by the parties, thereby reducing the need for evidentiary
hearings and reducing costs to both debtors and creditors. The Till
plurality placed the burden on creditors to prove the appropriate risk
adjustment."3 Under this structure, debtors could simply propose the
use of the flat prime rate, forcing creditors to object to the proposed
plan and argue for the addition of a risk premium at an evidentiary
hearing. Because the Till plurality indicated that the prime rate
requires a risk premium adjustment in every case, leaving the amount
of such premium as the only issue for determination,' it would be
nonsensical for a secured creditor to accept an unadjusted prime rate.
Likewise, it is nonsensical to require creditors and debtors to bear the
expense of an evidentiary hearing in every case.
With an en banc decision as a guide, debtors could calculate the
presumptive rate applicable to their specific cases by totaling the
assigned premium points for standard factors. Generally, only
creditors who felt entitled to a higher rate based on additional
circumstances of the particular case (those outside the presumptive
rate factors), and who could not come to an agreement with the
debtor, would insist on an evidentiary hearing. Because the
presumptive risk premiums are merely presumptive, creditors would
be free to object to those as well. However, such objections would be
rare since the court previously approved of the presumptive
premiums and would not be likely to overrule itself, thus, creditors
would generally be unwilling to incur the costs of an objection that is
unlikely to be sustained. Such an approach thereby advances the
plurality's desire to "minimize ... the need for potentially costly
additional evidentiary proceedings.""' 2
Some courts following the Till plurality approach have set a flat
presumptive risk premium applicable to every case.133 While setting a
single default premium is the simplest way to provide guidance to
debtors and creditors and to avoid an evidentiary hearing in every
130. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1961.
131. See id. ("Because bankrupt debtors typically pose a greater risk of nonpayment
than solvent commercial borrowers, the approach then requires a bankruptcy court to
adjust the prime rate accordingly.") (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. See Administrative Order, supra note 128 (adopting a default cram down interest
rate of prime plus 2% in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Till); see also In re
Berksteiner, No. 03-13203, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1576, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004)
(applying the plurality's opinion in Till and upholding a default rate of 12% provided by
Local Bankruptcy Rule 3001-2).
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case, it fails to comply with the plurality's indication that
determination of the appropriate risk premium must be made on a
case-by-case basis."' However, using the suggested presumptive risk
premiums for standard factors requires individual analysis of the
circumstances of each case to calculate the total presumptive
premium. Such individual analysis better complies with a
requirement of case-by-case determinations. The case-by-case
application of the presumptive risk premium points and availability of
an evidentiary hearing if the parties fail to agree or desire to present
evidence of other relevant circumstances of the case should satisfy the
plurality's suggestion of case-by-case determinations and the need for
an evidentiary hearing.
Although the Court's decision in Till is difficult to interpret when
searching for a holding to bind lower courts, as a practical matter,
courts will view the bankruptcy court's prime-plus formula approach
as receiving the votes of five Justices, making the plurality's prime-
plus formula method the controlling opinion. While the decision may
have failed to produce a binding holding under the Marks test, the
search for the appropriate cram down rate has been settled to the
extent that lower courts continue to accept the plurality's prime-plus
formula method. Adoption of this method will result in a uniform
approach and a fairly predictable cram down rate. The rate will be
made even more predictable and straightforward if courts adopt
presumptive risk premium points to aid debtors in proposing an
acceptable cram down rate.
The history of disagreement over the cram down rate, of which
legislators were certainly aware, was not enough to force Congress to
enact remedial legislation prior to Till, and it seems equally unlikely
that Congress will enact legislation to resolve the matter now. As the
plurality points out, Congress did consider and reject legislation
endorsing the presumptive contract rate approach; thus, if remedial
legislation is enacted, it is highly unlikely that it would endorse the
134. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1961 ("The appropriate size of that risk adjustment depends,
of course, on such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and
the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan."); Bivens, 317 B.R. at 769 (applying
the Supreme Court's decision in Till and noting that "the issue of the proper risk premium
must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances"); In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631, 634 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (applying the
Supreme Court's decision in Till to require the Bankruptcy Court to conduct case-by-case
evidentiary hearings to determine the appropriate risk premium for each case and
reversing the Bankruptcy Court's uniform application of an "Agreed Formula," consisting
of the T-bill rate plus a 3% risk adjustment, to every Chapter 13 case).
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dissent's approach.135 As long as courts follow the plurality opinion,
the Supreme Court is unlikely to revisit the issue. Accordingly, unless
Congress acts, the plurality's prime-plus formula approach will be
adopted as the "law of the land."
APRIL E. KIGHT
135. See Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1962 n.19 (citing H.R. 1085, 98th Cong., § 19(2)(A) (1983);
H.R. 1169, 98th Cong., § 19(2)(A) (1983); H. R. 4786, 97th Cong., § 19(2)(A) (1981)).
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